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THE FTC LEGEND IN LOUISIANA
The Federal Trade Commission enacted the Preservation of Con-
sumers Claims and Defenses Rule' in response to perceived abuses of
the holder-in-due-course doctrine2 in consumer transactions. The usual
example of such abuses involved a buyer who would sign a negotiable
note in connection with his purchase of consumer goods. The seller
would transfer the note to a third-party lender. If the buyer refused to
pay, even for good reason, the lender would invoke his holder-in-due-
course status to block the assertion of any claims or defenses. Thus, a
buyer who received defective goods or who otherwise had a defense to
payment as against the seller was nevertheless forced to render payment
to the seller's transferee.
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I. 16 C.F.R. 433 (1987). Pertinent portion reads as follows:
In connection with any sale or lease of goods or services to consumers, in
or affecting commerce as "commerce" is defined in the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, it is an unfair or deceptive act or practice within the meaning of
section 5 of that Act for a seller, directly or indirectly, to:
(a) Take or receive a consumer credit contract which fails to contain the
following provision in at least ten point, bold face, type:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT
TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT
AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSU-
ANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HER-
EUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY
THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.
or,
(b) Accept, as full or partial payment for such sale or lease, the proceeds of
any purchase money loan (as purchase money loan is defined herein), unless
any consumer credit contract made in connection with such purchase money
loan contains the following provision in at least ten point, bold face, type:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT
TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT
AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED WITH
THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR
SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.
16 C.F.R 433.2 (emphasis added).
2. Under La. R.S. 10:3-302 (1983) a "holder in due course" is defined as "a holder
who takes the instrument (a) for value; and (b) in good faith.; and (c) without notice
that it is overdue or has been dishonored or any defense against or claim to it on the
part of any person." "Instrument" is defined by La. R.S. 10:3-102(l)(e)(1983) to mean
a negotiable instrument.
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The FTC rule requires insertion of a notice in all consumer paper. 3
The effect of this mandatory incorporation of a notice should be to
preclude the subsequent transferee of the paper from acquiring the rights
of a holder in due course.4 Consequently, a consumer should now be
able to raise legitimate claims and defenses notwithstanding the seller's
transfer of the note. Although this FTC regulation has been in effect
since 1976,1 it is evident from Louisiana case law that problems continue
with respect to its enforcement.
Code of Civil Procedure Article 424
One of the problems concerns the interpretation of negotiability
under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 424.6 This article deals
with the assertion of a cause of action as a defense. As a general rule,
the assertion of a cause of action as a defense is allowed, even though
it has otherwise prescribed. However, the article specifically disallows
the assertion of a prescribed defense of redhibition in connection with
the enforcement of a negotiable instrument. Because this limitation ap-
plies to negotiable instruments only, its application turns on whether an
instrument containing the FTC notice retains its negotiable character.
One of the requirements of negotiability is an "unconditional promise
or order to pay. ' 7 The language of the FTC notice could be construed
3. The Rule (16 C.F.R. 433) uses the term "consumer credit contract" and defines
it as "[a]ny instrument which evidences or embodies a debt arising from a "Purchase
Money Loan" transaction or a 'financed sale' .. "
4. Under state law, a paper bearing the FTC notice no longer contains an "un-
conditional promise to pay" and should not be considered "negotiable." La. R.S. 10:3-
104(l)(b) (1983). One must be the holder of a negotiable instrument to acquire the rights
of a holder in due course. Therefore, the effect of the FTC notice, and the interaction
of state law, is to preclude the subsequent transferee from acquiring the rights of a holder
in due course. The scope of this article is limited to a discussion of the court's failure
to analyze the negotiability issue thoroughly. The use of the FTC regulation to give the
holder of consumer paper a potential cause of action against a subsequent transferee is
beyond the scope of this article.
5. See supra note 1.
6. La. Code Civ. P. art. 424:
A person who has a right to enforce an obligation also has a right to use
his cause of action as a defense.
Except as otherwise provided herein, a prescribed obligation arising under
Louisiana law may be used as a defense if it is incidental to, or connected
with, the obligation sought to be enforced by the plaintiff. A prescribed cause
of action arising under The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act may not
be used as a defense even if it is incidental to, or connected with, the obligation
sought to be enforced by the plaintiff.
However, in connection with the enforcement of a negotiable instrument the
defense of redhibition may not be used if it has otherwise prescribed. (emphasis
supplied).
7. La. R.S. 10:3-104(i)(b)(1983).
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as making the promise or order to pay "conditional." If so, an in-
strument containing the notice would not be considered negotiable, 8 thus
avoiding the application of the exception in article 424. Certain Louisiana
cases, however, have concluded otherwise.
In General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Johnson,9 the buyer
executed a promissory note in connection with his purchase of an au-
tomobile. When the buyer ceased making payments on the note, GMAC,
the holder, instituted executory process and subsequently filed suit for
deficiency judgement. The buyer asserted redhibition as a defense under
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 424. If the paper were not
negotiable, the limitation in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article
424 would be inapplicable, and the buyer could go forward with his
defense.
Initially, the court noted the presence of the required FTC notice.
With the notice present, the defense of redhibition was available against
GMAC. 10 In the court's view, it was the FTC notice itself, not the
nonnegotiability of the instrument, that allowed the defense as an initial
matter. The court, however, went on to state that "the note itself meets
all the requirements of negotiability."" This finding led to the conclusion
that the limitation in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 424 was
applicable. Because the defense of redhibition was asserted more than
one year after the sale12 or discovery"3 of the alleged defects, the claim
had prescribed, and in light of the court's conclusion of negotiability,
the defense could not be raised.
If the court had analyzed the issue properly, it may have found
that the promise contained in the instrument was made conditional by
the presence of the notice, making the note nonnegotiable. The court
added: "[Tihe federal regulation cannot avail the [consumer] since, under
state law, redhibition (once prescribed) is not an available defense against
8. See J. White and R. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform
Commercial Code 14-8, at 572 (1980). See also Hersbergen, Developments in the Law-
Private Law: Banking Law, 41 La. L. Rev. 313, 315 (1980), in particular footnote 6, for
an excellent discussion on the possible destruction of negotiability when the FTC notice
is included.
9. 426 So. 2d 691 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), writ denied 433 So. 2d 151 (1983).
10. Id. at 695.
11. Id.
12. La. Civ. Code art. 2534: "The redhibitory action must be instituted within a
year, at the farthest, commencing from the date of the sale"
13. La. Civ. Code art 2546:
In this case, the action for redhibition may be commenced at any time,
provided a year has not elapsed since the discovery of the vice.
This discovery is not to be presumed; it must be proved by the seller.
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the seller.' ' 4 Therefore, the finding of negotiability compelled the con-
clusion that the buyer's defense was barred by the operation of article
424.
The language of Johnson suggests certain policy considerations that
may have influenced the court. 5 The court found the purpose of Louis-
iana Code of Civil Procedure article 424, when construed against the
federal regulation, to be as follows: "[T]o increase the merchantability
of negotiable instruments by limiting the defenses assertable against the
seller." The defense of redhibition, in certain circumstances, is limited
by the exception in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 424. The
more broadly this exception is defined, the less the risk associated with
the purchase of negotiable instruments. The reduction of risk leads to
a decrease in the discount rate, which should result in an increase in
merchantability of the paper.' 6 Thus, the court seemed to be interested
in making consumer paper more valuable by limiting the effect of the
federal regulation. In a footnote, the court added, "[T]he enactment of
16 C.F.R. 433 does not prevent Louisiana from limiting defenses avail-
able against sellers and holders alike, since determination of rights and
liabilities of sellers and purchasers is a matter of state law."' 7
Even assuming the validity of the state's power in this area, it is
the court's haphazard reasoning that is so disturbing. 8 Despite the
importance of the question, this court failed to analyze the issue thor-
oughly. If Louisiana courts wish to use article 424 to enhance the value
of consumer paper, they must first address the negotiability question
head-on. Instead of simply stating that the note retains its negotiable
character despite the inclusion of the FTC notice, the court defining
the scope of article 424 must explain its actions fully. Why is the note
negotiable? Doesn't the inclusion of the notice render the promise "con-
ditional"? 9 If not, why not?
14. 426 So. 2d at 696.
15. Id. at 697.
16. Id.
17. Id. n. 4.
18. See First Homestead Federal Savings v. Dent, 459 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1984) (Johnson cited with approval).
19. A more fundamentally sound analysis is offered by the Maryland court in Thomp-
son v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 429 A.2d 277 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981). Thomas involved
a retail installment contract assigned to Ford Motor Credit Co. Under the facts of the
case, the insertion of the notice became a part of the contract. However, the court
recognized that with respect to negotiable paper, "[tihe language of the notice deprives
the paper of its negotiability in that it becomes a conditional promise to pay a sum
certain; one requirement for asserting the rights of a holder in due course is that one
must be the holder of negotiable paper."
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Failure of Certain Appellate Courts to Acknowledge the Regulation
A related problem deals with the outright failure of courts to discuss
the relevance of the FTC regulation. In Associates Financial Services
Company v. Ryan,2 0 a secured lender sought to enforce payment of a
note executed in connection with the buyer's purchase of a truck. The
buyer filed a reconventional demand against the lender alleging the
existence of redhibitory defects. The third circuit, in dismissing the
reconventional demand, concluded that the buyer's claim was "totally
without merit." The court focused on the fact that the lender did not
act as a seller or manufacturer. The lender's role, said the court, was
restricted to financing the purchase of the truck.2' The court, however,
made no mention at all of the FTC regulation and the possible effect
of the notice.
Perhaps the factual circumstances justify the result in the case.
Unfortunately, the court fails to provide a clear statement of such facts.
The court does not discuss whether the seller labelled the note pursuant
to the federal regulation, so one explanation would be the absence of
the legend on the note in question. In a case of noncompliance with
the federal regulation, the seller would be subject to sanction for com-
mitting an "unfair trade practice."2
Another explanation for the court's silence on such an apparently
pertinent issue goes beyond the negotiability question. Proving the "hon-
esty in fact"23-required of a holder-in-due-course-could be a difficult
burden for a sophisticated lender that received consumer paper not
containing the FTC notice. It is at least arguable, then, that the holder-
in-due-course status of this lender would be jeopardized by its lack of
"good faith," '24 so that even if the paper were not labelled properly,
the consumer could raise his defense aiainst the note holder.
A better explanation may be found in the nature of the underlying
transaction. For the regulation to apply, the buyer must be a "con-
sumer." Federal regulations define a consumer as "[a] natural person
who seeks or acquires goods or services for personal, family, or house-
hold use." ' 25 In Ryan, the item purchased was a "Mack" truck. If this
issue had been properly addressed, it is likely the court would have
20. 382 So. 2d 215 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
21. Id. at 220-21.
22. J. White and R. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform Commercial
Code 14-8, at 1142 (1980). See La. R.S. 51:1405 and related jur'sprudence illustrating
what constitutes unfair trade practices under the statute.
23. La. R.S. 10:3-302(1)(b) (1983).
24. La. R.S. 10:1-201(19) (1983).
25. 16 C.F.R. 433.1 (1987).
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concluded that a consumer transaction was not involved. Hence, the
FTC regulation would have been inapplicable in the first place. 26
While the outcome of the case may not have changed, it is the
court's refusal to address the pertinent issues that is most troublesome.
What about the applicability of the FTC regulation? Did the court
overlook the FTC regulation, or did it intend to override the FTC? If
the court intended the latter, why was this not adequately explained?
Instead, the court's use of such broad, sweeping language in its abrupt
dismissal of the buyer's demand presents a misleading statement of the
law.
In General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Sims, 27 the buyer
financed the purchase of a used car through GMAC. When the buyer
failed to make any payments on the promissory note, GMAC instituted
suit to seize the vehicle. In response, the buyer filed a reconventional
demand against GMAC asserting the existence of redhibitory defects.
The Louisiana Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the buyer's
reconventional demand. The court refused to hold GMAC liable because
the company served only as a lender and neither as a seller or manu-
facturer. The court cited Associates Financial Services Co. v. Ryan in
support of this conclusion. 8
This decision lends credence to concerns over the broad language
used by the third circuit in Ryan. There is no discussion in Sims about
the inclusion of the FTC notice and the effect, if any, of that notice.
More troubling is the identity of the lender in Sims. There can be no
doubt that GMAC was aware of the consumer origin of the transaction.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article is to implore the courts to stop ignoring
the existence of the FTC regulation. The issues must be discussed ex-
pressly by the courts and dealt with in a carefully reasoned and candid
manner. While the courts may not feel compelled to effectuate the
intended result of the FTC regulation, they cannot simply avoid the
issue. Courts should first recognize the existence of the FTC regulation.
Then, a clear statement of the facts should be given, specifically noting
whether the FTC notice was included. Instead of blindly ruling on the
negotiable character of the paper, the court must go to the core of the
problem, whether the inclusion of the notice renders the paper "con-
ditional" under state law. The court should then determine the nego-
26. See Jefferson Bank and Trust Co. v. Stamatiou, 384 So. 2d 388 (La. 1980).
27. 472 So. 2d 111 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985).
28. Id. at 114.
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tiability of the paper on those grounds. If the courts continue ignoring
the problem, their slackardness can only lead to more confusion among
the circuits.
Jane A. Robert

